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Foreword
Southern Africa is rich in natural resources and has significant reserves of several of the world’s most 
strategic minerals like gold, platinum, diamonds, chrome, manganese, copper, uranium, nickel, and 
cobalt. How these mineral resources are managed has implications for development outcomes and the 
fight against poverty, inequality, and unemployment. Extractive industries represent a potential source 
of wealth for Southern African Development Community  (SADC) economies and a variety of 
benefits, including industrialisation through value addition to minerals; job creation; export earnings, 
and technology and skills transfer. 
Many initiatives exist to promote good governance in the extractive industries. Unfortunately, for 
most of the SADC countries, mineral extraction and trade are not bringing benefits. The problem 
is multidimensional and touches the entire chain of production and commercialisation: weak state 
institutions; insufficient knowledge of the quality and quantity of minerals; weak contract negotiation 
capability; corruption; weak labour, social and environmental protection; unpredictable and weak 
fiscal regimes, and weak community engagement and protection. 
In response to past failures in the management of mineral resources, there are increasing efforts to 
ensure that they play a positive role in the development and growth of the region. There are many 
initiatives in the region monitoring the mining industry with a view to increasing accountability and 
transparency. However, despite enormous efforts and resources committed to ensuring that minerals 
benefit citizens, these initiatives have failed to have the any significant impact as we continue to 
attest to the signing of dubious mining contracts; illicit financial flows; corruption; environmental 
destruction, and human rights abuses. 
Currently there is no comprehensive and systematic body of knowledge that analyses the sector in 
a comparative way in the region so that learning points are created on how countries manage their 
mining sectors.
The Mineral Governance Barometer is an attempt to close that gap by publishing a research report 
every two years that systematically and comprehensively assesses progress made by SADC countries 
towards good governance of their mineral resources. It interrogates the effectiveness of mineral and 
economic governance in all SADC countries. The Mineral Governance Barometer is a compilation of 
empirical indicators of the extent and quality of mineral governance in Southern Africa. 
In this first issue, which is a pilot study, the focus is on regulatory frameworks and on a state’s 
capacity to implement policies and generally manage the sector.  Today’s governments are challenged 
with creating new approaches to governance that enable them to better exploit the developmental 
potential provided by mineral resources. Establishing regulatory frameworks and state capacity to 
ensure that activities of mining companies are compatible with efforts to promote inclusive and 
sustainable development are central to this challenge.  
Siphosami Malunga





Southern Africa is endowed with lucrative mineral resources such as diamonds, gold, copper, 
coal, platinum, and uranium.  This rich endowment can be a major asset in the quest for 
inclusive and sustainable development, yet mining in Southern Africa has often been criticised 
as an enclave sector that at best contributes little to economic development and at worst does 
substantial social and environmental harm.  To avoid such pitfalls emerging international 
consensus emphasises the importance of good mineral governance. This involves the adoption 
and implementation of regulatory frameworks that promote deeper linkages between the 
mining sector and the broader economy, and that protect people and the environment from 
the potentially harmful consequences of mineral extraction.
This pilot study provides a barometer of mineral governance in ten Southern African countries: 
Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Namibia, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  The barometer takes stock of mining 
regulations in place at the end of 2015, the extent to which they are implemented, and features of 
supporting institutions.  It is based on the observation that while regulations impose obligations 
on mining companies, in doing so they directly impose obligations on the state to monitor and 
enforce compliance, and they also indirectly impose obligations for citizens and civil society to 
hold the state and mining companies accountable.  The barometer includes indicators of mineral 
governance across four main issue-areas: national economic and fiscal linkages; community 
impact; labour, and the environment, with artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) treated as a 
special topic.  The barometer also includes indicators of state capacity and state accountability 
with respect to mineral governance.
Specialist researchers collected the data used to calculate the indicators in each country using 
a standardised research instrument.  The in-country researchers collaborated in developing 
and refining the instrument during two workshops.  An important feature of the data set is 
that it consists of objective descriptions of patterns of regulation and implementation and 
of institutional arrangements, not on subjective value judgements.  Researchers compiled 
information from publicly available, although not always easily accessible sources, to capture 
not only whether a particular regulation exists in a country, for example, but also whether the 
state has recently detected or penalised any company for failing to comply with regulations.  
Key findings can be summarised on three levels: the prevalence of regulations, the extent of 
monitoring and enforcement, and the importance of accountability.  
The prevalence of regulations varies substantially across countries but is generally high, with five 
of the ten countries having more than two-thirds of the regulations we looked for.  The extent of 
monitoring and enforcement is considerably lower, with only patchy publicly-available evidence 
of states detecting and punishing non-compliance by mining companies.  
Accountability mechanisms that provide pluralistic fora for public participation emerge as the best 
predictors of monitoring and enforcement.  Stated differently, government officials are less likely 
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to overlook breaches by mining companies when the citizens and civil society are keeping track. 
The findings are also helpful in identifying gaps in what we call “regulatory presence” – a 
composite of regulations, monitoring, and enforcement.  Regulatory presence is lower for 
economic/fiscal linkages and community impact than it is for labour and environmental 
regulations.  One interpretation is that labour and environmental regulations often apply by 
default across many sectors, while regulations about linkages and community impact are more 
specific to mineral extraction.  A complementary interpretation is that civil society is often 
better organised around labour and environmental issues, while the affected constituencies in 
the other issue-areas are more likely to be sectorally fragmented (economic/fiscal linkages) or 
geographically isolated (community impact).
National mineral governance scores differ in ways that in part reflect the size and importance 
of a country’s mining sector, but notable exceptions also emerge.  The top four countries are 
well-known mining economies (South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Zambia), however 
the scores of two other well-established mining economies (the DRC and Namibia) are 
noticeably lower (the DRC with many regulations but weak implementation, and Namibia 
with few regulations but a better record of implementing them).  Lesotho and Swaziland, which 
have small mining sectors, had the lowest scores; however, the scores of the emerging mining 
economies of Madagascar and Malawi are noticeably higher, with Madagascar having the 
greatest regulatory presence on community impact and ASM, and Malawi scoring particularly 
well on environmental policies.  
The barometer provides an empirical baseline for describing mineral governance in the ten 
Southern African countries in the pilot study.  Further research could extend this baseline to 
other countries and to the petroleum sector to facilitate a broader comparative and statistical 
analysis.  The finding that accountability mechanisms are crucial suggests that further research 
is likely to more directly probe patterns of contestation across a range of key stakeholders from 
mining companies and the state to labour unions and civil society organisations.  Information 
about stakeholder priorities and positions would help to identify areas of conflict and consensus 
and complement the descriptive indicators in the pilot study.
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Mineral Governance 
Barometer: Southern Africa 
Introduction
Southern Africa is endowed with lucrative mineral resources – such as diamonds, gold, copper, 
coal, platinum, and uranium – and some countries possess large mineral reserves.  The region 
also has a legacy of colonial or settler regimes – regimes that often privileged the interests of 
mining companies over the welfare of local inhabitants and the protection of the environment. 
A rich mineral endowment can be a major asset in the quest for inclusive and sustainable 
development.  Yet deficiencies in mineral governance have fuelled the criticism that the mining 
sector is an enclave that at best contributes little to development and at worst does substantial 
social and environmental harm.  Governments in Southern Africa face the challenge of better 
exploiting the developmental potential of their mineral resources.
Establishing regulatory frameworks to align the activities of mining companies with inclusive 
and sustainable development is central to the challenge of mineral governance. An emerging 
global consensus emphasises the need to regulate mining “every step of the way, from discovering 
minerals in the ground, to extracting them and transforming them into sustainable development” 
(World Bank 2016; also see Barma et al. 2012; Campbell 2003).  Regulatory frameworks must 
in this view promote deeper linkages between the mining sector and the national economy, 
and they must protect people and the environment from the harmful consequences of mineral 
extraction.  Within Africa the outlines of a “blueprint” for development-oriented mining is 
emerging – for example, in the African Union’s (2009) Africa Mining Vision and in efforts to 
harmonise mining regulations in Southern Africa (United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa and Southern African Development Community 2004).  
While enacting an appropriate regulatory framework is crucial, it is only a first step in 
establishing effective mineral governance.  A regulatory framework only has its desired effects if 
the government has the capacity and motivation to implement it.  The framework itself consists 
of laws and regulations, many of which impose direct requirements or restrictions on mining 
companies.  In imposing these obligations on mining companies, a government indirectly 
imposes obligations on itself and on the state – an obligation to monitor company behaviour 
to detect non-compliance, and an obligation to penalise companies that do not comply.  A 
government is only able to meet these obligations if it has access to state machinery with the 
required administrative capacity, and only likely to be motivated to meet these obligations 
consistently if it operates in an environment in which citizens and civil society can hold it 
to account.  Understanding mineral governance as more than adopting a regulatory blueprint 
requires attention to implementation, state capacity and accountability.
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Despite increasing attention to mineral governance, our ability to compare the records of 
Southern African countries systematically has remained limited.  Some studies offer sweeping 
analyses of the adverse consequences of failed resource governance throughout Africa (Bond 
2006; Burgis 2015; Kabemba 2013).  Others provide qualitative detail on specific aspects of 
mineral governance or in specific countries – for example on international efforts to promote 
diamond certification (Grant and Taylor 2004) and on the impact of uranium mining on local 
livelihoods in Malawi (Kamlongera 2013).  The World Bank (2016b) recently initiated a project 
to collect detailed information about mineral governance, though its current coverage is limited, 
and it emphasises single-country diagnostics.  Important cross-national data sources, such 
as those compiled by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (2010) and Revenue 
Watch Institute (2013) are concerned primarily with revenue transparency, and their coverage 
of Southern Africa is patchy.  Meanwhile, extensive quantitative research on the “natural 
resource curse” primarily compares developmental outcomes in resource-rich versus resource-
poor countries, rather than analysing differences in resource governance among resource-rich 
countries (Alence 2015).  This all points to a gap in the understanding of mineral governance 
in Southern Africa.  The urgency of Southern Africa Resource Watch’s call for “instruments 
that will allow for an easy and correct assessment of the manner in which resources are being 
managed in the region” (2013: 7) is difficult to dispute.
This study attempts to heed this call by putting forward empirical indicators of mineral 
governance in 10 Southern African countries.  The indicators measure state capacity and 
accountability mechanisms in the sector, and the scope and implementation of regulatory 
frameworks in four main issue-areas: national economic and fiscal linkages, community impact, 
labour, and the environment.  The special topic of ASM is also explored.  While no set of 
indicators can be definitive, careful attention is given to measurement validity and reliability. 
We hope the indicators contribute to understanding mineral governance in Southern Africa.
What is Mineral Governance?
Political scientists have defined “governance” as the process of making rules, adjudicating what 
those rules mean, and enforcing them (Easton 1957). We understand “mineral governance” 
to consist of formulating laws and official regulations (“rules”) about the extraction and use 
of mineral resources.  Implementation of rules includes monitoring compliance by mining 
companies and penalising them for non-compliance.  As the scope of regulatory frameworks 
to address economic, social, and environmental consequences of mining has expanded, so have 
demands on the state to formulate and implement these frameworks.  We draw an analogy 
between aspects of mineral governance and the distinction in physics between kinetic energy 
(energy in action) and potential energy (energy due to position or arrangement).  Our indicators 
capture what the state does when it governs the mining sector (mineral governance “in action”) 
as well as attributes of the state that affect its motivation and capacity to pursue socially desirable 
patterns of mineral governance (mineral governance “in potential”).
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Mineral Governance in Action
The African Union’s (2009) Africa Mining Vision has informed the issue-areas in which we 
measure mineral governance in action.  Global multilateral institutions (EITI Secretariat 2016; 
World Bank 2016a) have also increasingly embraced these.  We identified and refined these issue-
areas in a collaborative workshop with in-country researchers and regional experts.  The four main 
issue-areas in which regulatory frameworks and their implementation are investigated are:




ASM, with its distinctive challenges, is considered separately.
Our indicators of mineral governance in action capture the prevalence of rules and the extent 
of implementation in the four main issue-areas.  In-country researchers used a standardised 
research instrument to collect evidence by reviewing legislation, official documents, and news 
media reports, and by interviewing “key informants.”  For each prospective rule contained in the 
instrument, they asked three questions: 
1. Does such a rule exist in the country’s laws or regulations? 
2.  Does publicly available evidence exist indicating that an official body has detected 
non-compliance with the rule by a mining company during the past five years? 
3.  Is there publicly available evidence indicating that an official body has enforced the 
rule by imposing a penalty on a mining company within the past five years? 
The indicators describe patterns of activity (or the lack thereof ) in each country without being 
value-laden by researchers.  In principle, this approach can be replicated by researchers with 
different subjective views about what good mineral governance should consist of.  A disadvantage 
is that the indicators cannot be interpreted uncritically as measures of quality.  For example, there 
might be an expectation that elaborate regulations to protect local communities imply better 
governance in a particular issue-area; however, regulations that are poorly conceived or poorly 
implemented may bring no benefit or even cause harm.  In the same way, where companies are 
regularly found to violate mining laws and are punished for doing so, this does not necessarily 
mean the state is successfully implementing regulations. If this was the case, companies would 
be so certain of punishment that they would be deterred from violating laws in the first place.  
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Mineral Governance in Potential 
Capacity and accountability are the two major attributes of a state that pursues socially desirable 
patterns of mineral governance. Indicators of a state’s capacity and accountability enable us to 
investigate whether they are associated empirically with our indicators of a state in action. 
“State capacity” refers to the ability of a state to manage its mining sector effectively.  State 
capacity is required to formulate an appropriate regulatory framework.  The state must be 
able, for example, to collect, disseminate, and analyse information about the size, structure, 
and impact of its mining sector.  Once rules have been formulated, state capacity is needed to 
implement them.  The state must be able to monitor whether mining companies comply with 
the requirements and restrictions imposed on them, and it must be able to impose penalties for 
non-compliance.  The greater its capacity, the greater a state’s potential will be to achieve socially 
“State accountability” refers to mechanisms that allow citizens, civil society, and other non-
state actors to hold the state (including its political leadership and administrative agents) to its 
obligations to regulate, monitor, and enforce compliance in the mining sector.  Accountability 
mechanisms include legislative and judicial processes and independent institutions that impose 
restraints on the use of executive authority.  State accountability is crucial in motivating state 
officials to pursue socially desirable patterns of mineral governance.  Without accountability, 
mineral governance can easily degenerate into a selective, rent-seeking activity, where politicians 
or state officials relax rules for companies that give favours or pay bribes, and enforce the rules 
more vigorously for companies that do not.  A state that can be called to account for failing to 
meet its obligations will be motivated to achieve socially desirable patterns of governance in the 
mining sector.
A state that is capable and accountable is desirable in its own right. However, our aim is to 
determine whether potential for mineral governance translates into mineral governance in 
action.  Are states that can be held accountable more likely to regulate their mining sectors 
in ways that are conducive to inclusive and sustainable development?  Are states with greater 
capacity more likely to implement regulations effectively?  Our analysis investigates whether 
our indicators of governance in potential and governance in action go together in practice. 
Measuring Mineral Governance
The mining sectors of the ten Southern African countries in our study vary widely in size and 
importance, as shown in Table 1.  South Africa has by far the largest mining industry, earning 
more than $29 billion in 2014.  It has well over 100 current mining projects with an ore reserve 
value of at least $250 million.  Swaziland has the smallest mining industry, earning $11 million 
in 2014 and lacking any large current projects.  The top six countries in the table, listed in 
order of total mining income, have been major mining economies for a long time.  They face 
the challenges of “mature” industries – including the depletion of high-yield deposits and the 
accumulated social and environmental consequences of mining and mine closure.  The DRC and 
Botswana stand out as the most economically dependent on mining, which in 2014 accounted 
for more than one-fifth of their GDP.  The bottom four in the table have smaller mining sectors 
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that have grown in recent years.  Since the discovery of lucrative diamond deposits in Lesotho, 
for example, mining has grown from a negligible share of GDP to 8.7 percent.
Table 1: Mining in Ten Southern African Countries
Number of Mining 
Projects




(per cent of GDP)
South Africa 143 29,454 8.4
Congo, DR 23 7,759 23.7
Botswana 17 4,017 25.3
Zambia 10 1,774 6.5
Namibia 11 1,593 12.4
Zimbabwe 13 1,340 9.4
Lesotho 4 190 8.7
Malawi 3 59 1.1
Madagascar 6 36 0.3
Swaziland  0 11 0.3
Note: “Number of mining projects” is those with assessed ore reserve value of more than 
$250 million (Banerjee et al. 2015); total mining income and mining (per cent of GDP) are 
from SADC 2014.
Differences in the size and history of the mining sectors in the 10 countries are relevant 
as we turn to the indicators of mineral governance.  We might, for example, expect to see 
greater regulatory attention given to mining in countries with large industries that account 
for large shares of GDP.  However, smaller industries also tend have higher rates of growth, 
and arguably an active regulatory presence is especially important when new mining projects 
are being developed.  History may also matter, as approaches to mineral governance in Africa 
have changed substantially over time.  They have fluctuated between emphasising private 
versus state ownership, and over time concerns about social and environmental impact have 
received more attention.  Countries with long-established industries are more likely to approach 
mineral governance in ways that reflect the residue of experience, while countries with emerging 
industries may be more influenced by current ideas about best practice.  
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Measuring Mineral Governance in Potential
State Capacity
The capacity of a state, particularly for collecting and disseminating data about the size, shape, 
performance and impact of the mining industry, makes it possible to develop an informed 
regulatory framework that can be implemented effectively. 
The state capacity indicator determines whether a state carries out regular geologic surveys; 
whether the relevant ministry has access to basic research, legislative drafting, and legal 
expertise; whether data on the size, income, and fiscal contribution of the mining industry is 
accessible, and whether senior ministry officials have personal computers and Internet access. 
It also includes information on the frequency with which a state publishes information on the 
operations of mining companies, the fiscal contribution of mining, the social impact of mining, 
and whether a ministry has its own website. 
There are 27 separate items in the state capacity indicator, each scored between zero and one. 
These items, listed in Box 1, are clustered in six thematic sub-indicators.  Each country’s state 
capacity score is a simple average of the six sub-indicators, which mathematically must fall 
between zero and one.  A country with a score of zero would lack all 27 attributes investigated, 
and a country with a score of one would possess all 27 attributes.  A score of zero does not imply 
that a country has no state capacity at all, just as a score of one does not imply that a country 
has perfect state capacity.  The scores simply reveal the proportion of 27 attributes in place in 
each country.
Box 1: Measuring State Capacity
The indicator of State Capacity consists of 27 individual items:
Does the Ministry or Department with responsibility for the mining sector have 
access to:
• Legislative drafting expertise?
• Research support staff?
• Legal expertise on issues relevant to mining?
Does the Ministry or Department with responsibility for the mining sector have 
access to IT capacity:
• Have its own website?
• All or nearly all senior staff have computers with internet access?
Does the Ministry or Department with responsibility for the mining sector have 
access to official data:
• Regular geological survey data?
• Total national mineral reserves?
• Total income of the mining sector?
• Taxes, commissions, and royalties paid by mining companies?
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How often does an official body publish data on:
•  Gross earnings of the mining sector?
•  Investment in mining exploration and development?
•  Costs of mineral extraction (production)?
•  Production or earnings data broken down by mining company?
•  Cost of state subsidies to mining sector?
•  Taxes paid by the mining sector?
•  Royalties and non-tax payments to state by mining sector?
How often does an official body publish:
•  A registry of mining companies operating in the country?
•  Social impact assessments produced before new mining contracts are awarded or 
new projects are implemented? 
Social impact assessments for ongoing mining contracts or projects?
How often does government publish information on:
•  Mining sector contributions to national infrastructure (e.g., transport, energy, 
water)
•  Mining sector contributions to dedicated national development fund (e.g., 
education, housing, social development)
•  Total employment in mining sector
•  Employment of foreign nationals by mining sector
•  Employment of domestic technical staff in mining sector
•  Technical training to domestic staff in mining sector
•  Mining inputs (e.g., capital goods, consumables, services) procured from domestic 
suppliers
•  Extracted minerals processed within the country
8
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Figure 1 shows that the average score is 0.54, meaning that many countries lack key elements of 
state capacity.  Countries and their scores are presented in traffic-light colours to show whether 
their scores fall in the bottom third of the scale (red), the middle third of the scale (amber), or the 
top third of the scale (green).  South Africa and Botswana are in the green range, comfortably 
outperforming the rest, with more than 90 percent of the attributes we investigated.  This is 
not surprising, since South Africa has by far the largest mining sector in dollar terms, while 
Botswana has the largest mining sector as a share of GDP.  Zimbabwe, Namibia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Swaziland, and Zambia are in the amber range.  The bottom two countries, the DRC 
and Lesotho, are in the red range.  The weak showing of the DRC is particularly striking: it 
is a major mining economy that ranks second in mining income and in a share of GDP, yet it 
possesses less than one-third of the state capacity attributes.  Zambia is also a major mining 
economy with a disappointing score, perhaps partly reflecting difficulties adapting the state’s 
role in the wake of major privatisation reforms in the mining sector.  Lesotho’s position at the 
bottom of the rankings is less surprising, given its small mining sector.  However, the sector has 
been growing rapidly and weak state capacity could hinder the country’s ability to harness its 
resources effectively.
Figure 1: State Capacity (scores with confidence intervals)
 
Figure 1 also includes “confidence intervals” as horizontal lines around each score.  The scores 
themselves (dots) are always our best estimates of the characteristics in question.  The confidence 
intervals are statistical estimates of the scores’ reliability.  The intervals are calculated to show the 
reliability of differences between scores.  If two countries’ confidence intervals do not overlap 
horizontally, we can be 90 percent confident that the country to the right outperforms the 
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country to the left.  For example, Madagascar’s state capacity score is 0.52.  We can be confident 
that Madagascar’s score lags behind Botswana’s (0.91) and exceeds Lesotho’s (0.28), because 
their confidence intervals do not overlap.  But we should be much more cautious about claiming 
that Madagascar’s score lags behind Namibia (0.56) or exceeds Malawi’s score (0.46), because 
their confidence intervals overlap considerably.  (Technical details are reported in Table 5, in 
the appendix.)
State Accountability
The propensity of a state to translate mineral resources into inclusive and sustainable development 
is likely to depend on mechanisms of state accountability.  Legislative and judicial mechanisms, 
and the role played by independent institutions in limiting the scope of executive authority allow 
citizens, civil society, and other non-state actors to hold a state to its obligations to establish 
and enforce regulations in the mining sector.  An unaccountable state could fortuitously act as 
if guided by a benevolent dictator but its political leadership and administrative agents could 
be tempted to establish and enforce regulations selectively – corruptly extorting benefits from 
mining companies, or colluding with mining companies at the expense of its citizenry.  While 
state capacity gives a government the ability to govern effectively, accountability mechanisms 
give it the motivation to do so.
The indicator of state accountability is based on 32 items, listed in Box 2.  Most pertain to 
legislative and other independent, constitutional institutions through which government 
officials (and indirectly mining companies that collude with them) can be held accountable.  The 
time frame investigated was the five-year period up until the end of 2015.  A central focus was 
the legislative committee responsible for mining and any other consultative forums in which 
mining legislation is proposed and overseen.  Some items pertained to the expertise available to 
these institutions, as well as participation by trade unions, business organisations, civil society 
groups, and political parties.  Others focused on the activities of the legislative committees – 
whether they proposed or reviewed legislation and whether they convened oversight hearings 
on issues ranging from government contracts with mining companies, to mining companies’ 
compliance with applicable laws, to the government use of revenue derived from mining.  Some 
items focused on whether an independent, statutory body (like an Ombud or Public Protector) 
exists and receives public complaints related to the mining sector.  Others probed whether 
the government publishes information about gifts and other benefits that mining companies 
provide to government and government officials.  Finally, the indicator includes information 
about civil-society organisations and non-state news media.  These 32 items are clustered into 
eight sub-indicators. The state accountability indicator is the average of the sub-indicators.
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Box 2: Measuring State Accountability
The indicator of State Accountability consists of 32 items:
How often does government publish information about:
•  Gifts to government officials by businesses or citizens?
•  Business sponsorship of official trips by government officials?
•  Business sponsorship of official government meetings?
•  Business donations to the ruling party?
•  Business donations to opposition parties?
How often do:
•  Opposition parties participate in parliamentary mining forum consultations? 
•  Opposition parties participate in civil society mining forum consultations?
•  Business organisations participate in parliamentary mining forum consultations?
•  Business organisations participate in civil society mining forum consultations? 
•  Labour unions participate in parliamentary mining forum consultations?
•  Labour unions participate in civil society mining forum consultations?
•  Non-governmental organisations participate in parliamentary mining form 
consultations? 
•  Non-governmental organisations participate in civil society mining forum 
consultations?
Does the legislative committee with responsibility for the mining sector have:
• Access to legal expertise on issues relevant to mining?
• Access to legislative drafting expertise?
• Its own research support staff?
•  The power to require government ministers and officials to appear and answer 
questions?
Has the legislative committee with responsibility for the mining sector:
• Discussed new legislation related to mining?
•  Recommended amendment of existing, or adoption of new legislation related to 
mining?
• Heard evidence or testimony in hearings from trade unions?
•  Heard evidence or testimony from Chamber of mines or individual mining 
companies?
• Heard evidence or testimony from civil society organisations?
• Held oversight hearings on government contracts with mining companies?
• Held oversight hearings on government bid/tender processes in mining?
• Held oversight hearings on government use of income from mining?
•  Held oversight hearings on mining companies’ compliance with laws and 
regulations?
11
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•  Is there an independent statutory body such as an Ombud or Public Protector 
through which citizens or organisations may lodge complaints about mining 
companies compliance with licenses, contracts, or the law?
•  Has this independent statutory body heard complaints or grievances against mining 
companies?
•  Has this Independent statutory body recommended any actions against mining 
companies?
•  Is there formal multi-sectoral coordination between different ministries, 
departments, and or official bodies with regard to monitoring and reporting on 
operational aspects of environmental impact requirements for mining?
•  The number of civil society organisations active on mining issues (to a maximum of 
5)
•  Is there a non-state newspaper/publication that reports extensively on the mining 
industry?
Figure 2 shows that the average state accountability score is 0.63, exceeding the average state 
capacity score.  South Africa again leads, with more than 90 percent of the attributes investigated. 
Botswana, which scored highly on capacity, gets a much lower score on accountability, with 
approximately half the accountability attributes.  Zimbabwe scores almost as well as South 
Africa on accountability. This may reflect improvements in its legislature under the government 
of national unity at a time of considerable donor support. Madagascar and Lesotho again score 
at the low end, with less than half the attributes.  According to the accountability scores, many 
states lack mechanisms and patterns of engagement through which citizens, civil society, and 
other non-state actors can hold the state to its obligations to promote inclusive and sustainable 
development.
Figure 2: State Accountability (scores with confidence intervals)
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The Relationship between State Capacity and State Accountability 
The relationship between state capacity and accountability is shown in Figure 3, a scatter plot 
in which country labels are centred over their scores on the two indicators.  South Africa ranks 
first in both dimensions, while Lesotho ranks last in both.  Capacity and accountability are 
positively correlated – that is, countries with high scores for capacity also have higher scores 
for accountability, and vice versa.  The correlation (reported at the top of the figure) is modest 
at 0.36 – on a scale where zero means no correlation at all and one means a perfect positive 
correlation.  For several countries capacity and accountability differ substantially.  Botswana’s 
capacity score exceeds its accountability score by a wide margin, while Zambia’s accountability 
score exceeds its capacity score by almost as much.  Many different combinations of capacity and 
accountability appear in the scatter plot.  We now turn from mineral governance in potential to 
mineral governance in action to see how these differences play out in practice.
Figure 3: Association between State Capacity and Accountability

































Mineral Governance Barometer: Southern Africa
Measuring Mineral Governance in Action
The adoption and implementation of regulatory frameworks across the four issue-areas informed 
by the Africa Mining Vision and the more detailed follow-up (2011) report by the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa’s international study group on Africa’s mining 
regimes represent mineral governance in action. At a collaborative project workshop, 38 rules 
within these issue-areas (listed in Box 3) were identified.  For each item, in-country researchers 
asked three questions:   
•  Does a rule imposing requirements or restrictions on mining companies exist as of the 
end of 2015?
•  If so, is there credible evidence that an official body has detected non-compliance by a 
mining company within the past five years?
•  Where there is evidence of non-compliance is there proof that an official body has 
imposed penalties on a mining company within the past five years?
The answers to the first question, compiled across the 38 items, provide the basis for our estimate 
of the coverage of the country’s regulatory framework.  From the answers to the second and 
third questions, we estimated the degree of monitoring and enforcement.
In the rest of the section, we summarise the results across all four issue-areas.  The regulation 
indicator captures the prevalence of rules in each country – the overall scope of a country’s 
regulatory framework.  The monitoring and enforcement captures the rates of official detection 
and penalties for non-compliance, with respect to the rules in place in each country.  Finally, the 
regulatory presence indicator measures regulation, monitoring, and enforcement of all 38 rules. 
At each step, we examine the relationship between these indicators of mineral governance in 
action and state capacity and state accountability.
Regulation
The regulation indicator is the average prevalence of rules across the four issue-areas.  Technically 
the clustering of items into sub-indicators gives them subtly different weights.  Figure 4 presents 
the results.  The average score is 0.63, meaning that nearly two-thirds of the 38 rules are in place 
in the ten countries.  Eight of the 10 countries have at least half the rules in place.  Swaziland 
and Namibia are the exceptions.  Regulation scores are high for three countries with large and 
well-established mining sectors: Zambia leads with 82 percent prevalence, followed closely by 
South Africa and Botswana.  Despite having smaller and newer mining sectors, countries like 
Lesotho, Madagascar, and Malawi have enacted more than half of the rules – perhaps reflecting 
the recent trend toward more elaborate mining codes in Africa.  The three countries with the 
lowest scores on regulation – Botswana, Swaziland, and Namibia – have small populations, 
though Botswana and Namibia rank first and third of our 10 countries in mining income 
as a percentage of GDP.  Namibia, with regulation prevalence of only 35 percent, has been 
considering reforms to its mining code but had not made any major changes by the end of 2015.
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Box 3: Measuring Mining Regulation
The indicator of Regulation consists of the following 38 items across four issue-
areas.
National Linkages (11 items)
•  Do laws or regulations:
•  Specify penalties for mining companies that fail to publish earnings data?
•  Specify penalties for mining companies that fail to publish data on investment or 
extraction (production) costs?
•  Specify penalties for mining companies that fail to publish data on subsidies 
received from the state?
•  Specify penalties for mining companies that fail to pay taxes due?
•  Require mining companies to retain a portion of profits earned within the country?
•  Require mining companies to make a specific contribution to national infrastructure 
(e.g. transport, energy, water) OR to a dedicated national development fund (e g, 
education, housing, social development)?
•  Require mining companies to procure a portion of mining inputs (e.g. capital 
goods, consumables, services) from domestic suppliers?
•  Require mining companies to process domestically a portion of the minerals they 
extract (“beneficiate”)?
•  Require mining companies to create a minimum number of jobs OR to limit the 
employment of foreign nationals?
•  Require mining companies to hire a portion of their technical staff domestically?
•  Require mining companies to provide technical training for domestically hired 
technical staff?
Community Impact (13 items)
Do laws or regulations:
•  Require mining companies to obtain the consent of local communities affected by 
mining development?
•  Require mining companies to have regular, ongoing consultations with local 
communities affected by mining?
•  Require mining companies to conduct social impact assessments before contracts 
are awarded or new projects are implemented?
•  Require mining companies to conduct continuing social impact assessments after 
contracts are awarded or as projects are being implemented?
•  Prevent mining companies from buying private land directly from its owners?
•  Prevent mining companies from buying communal land directly from traditional 
leaders (or “chiefs”)?
•  Regulate mining companies’ ability to use local water supplies?
•  Restrict mining companies’ ability to displace local populations?
•  Require mining companies to resettle displaced populations?
•  Require mining companies to hire a portion of their workers or staff from the local 
community?
15
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•  Require mining companies to build or to make direct contributions to building 
public facilities for the use of local communities affected by mining OR to 
contribute financially to dedicated community funds?
•  Specify mining companies’ responsibilities for disaster management?
•  Restrict mining companies’ right to decide whether or when to close a mine?
Labour (9 items)
Do laws or regulations:
•  Specify a minimum wage applicable to the mining sector?
•  Require mining companies to get government permission to retrench workers?
•  Require mining companies to meet standards of worker safety?
•  Require mining companies to contribute to employee health care?
•  Require mining companies to meet standards of gender equality in employment 
practices?
•  Require mining companies to meet standards of gender equality in workplace 
practices?
•  Ban mining companies from employing children?
•  Specify when and how mining companies may discipline employees?
•  Specify when and how mining companies may terminate individual employees?
Environment (5 items)
Do laws or regulations:
•  Hold mining companies legally liable for local environmental damage?
•  Limit the quantity of minerals that companies are permitted to extract in a given 
year?
•  Require mining companies to conduct environmental impact assessments before 
contracts are awarded or new projects are initiated?
•  Require mining companies to compile formal environmental management plans?
•  Require mining companies to make financial contributions to dedicated 
environmental funds OR to make non-financial, offsetting contributions to 
environmental protection?
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Figure 4: Regulation (scores with confidence intervals)
With only 10 countries in our scatter plots, we cannot assert any strong generalisations. Among 
these 10 countries, though, accountability in the mining sector seems to be linked more closely 
to the prevalence of regulations than capacity is.
Figure 5: Association of Regulation with Capacity and with Accountability
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A substantive interpretation is that countries with robust accountability mechanisms and 
vibrant civil societies are more likely to regulate mining in ways that promote national economic 
and fiscal linkages, enhance community welfare, and protect workers and the environment. 
Robust accountability mechanisms allow trade unions, civil society organisations, and other 
non-state actors to play an active role in debating and exercising oversight of the mining sector. 
Countries with such mechanisms often end up with more elaborate sets of laws and regulations. 
Comparing Botswana and South Africa illustrates this.  Both have high levels of state capacity, 
but South Africa has a much more robust set of accountability mechanisms than Botswana 
does.  Seemingly, as a result it has a far more extensive regulatory framework.  Many factors 
other than accountability mechanisms may contribute to the prevalence of mining regulations. 
Some causality may run in the other direction, with extensive regulations encouraging broader 
participation in legislative committees and other consultative and oversight bodies.  But 
accountability and regulatory prevalence generally correlate in our 10 countries.
Monitoring and Enforcement
When a government imposes requirements or restrictions on mining companies, it imposes 
obligations on itself and the state apparatus to monitor companies’ activities and to apply penalties 
where appropriate.  No matter how well-crafted a country’s regulatory framework for mining is, 
without effective monitoring and enforcement it is just a set of documents on a shelf.  Our indicator 
of monitoring and enforcement focuses only on the specific rules (of the 38 in Box 3) that a country 
has adopted – since the state can only monitor and enforce rules that are official.  Monitoring is 
of the proportion of the 38 rules where an official body detected non-compliance by a mining 
company in the five years up until the end of 2015.  Enforcement relates to the proportion of the 
rules against which an official body imposed penalties on a mining company found to be non-
compliant in the same period.  The monitoring and enforcement indicator gives the average of the 
two proportions: detecting non-compliance and punishing non-compliance, as shown in Box 4. 
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Box 4: Measuring Monitoring/Enforcement and Regulatory Presence
Monitoring and Enforcement
The indicator of Monitoring and Enforcement is based on items regarding the 
detection and punishment of mining company non-compliance for those laws and 
regulations (of the 38 listed in Box 3) that a country has in place:
•  Publicly available evidence (court records, government findings, filed grievances) of 
official state detection of mining companies’ non-compliance with regard to each 
of the laws or regulations (a “conditional” average across only those laws and 
regulation in place in the country);
•  Evidence that the state has imposed penalties (e.g. remedial action, fines, license 
revoked/denied, criminal prosecution) on mining companies where non-compliance 
has been detected (a “conditional” average across only those laws and regulations 
in place in each country)
(The indicator of Monitoring and Enforcement is based on “conditional” averages to 
capture how well a country monitors and enforces the laws and regulations actually in 
place.)
Regulatory Presence
The indicator of Regulatory Presence combines an average of the Regulation and a 
modified version of the indicator of Monitoring and Enforcement for all the laws and 
regulations (of the 38 listed in Box 3), whether or not they are in place.
It is an equally weighted average of:
• The indicator of Regulation described in Box 3; and
•  A modified indicator of Monitoring and Enforcement (based on “unconditional” 
averages of detection and punishment of company non-compliance across all 38 
laws and regulations in Box 3).
(The modified indicator of Monitoring and Enforcement used in calculating Regulatory 
Presence avoids “rewarding” countries with fewer laws and regulations in place with 
higher scores.)
  
Since monitoring and enforcement are based on observable detection and penalties, countries 
with more cases of company non-compliance receive more attention.  A country like South 
Africa with more than 100 active mining companies is likely to see more non-compliance than a 
country like Swaziland that has only a handful of mining companies.  Moreover, states that excel 
at detecting and penalising non-compliance may deter non-compliance. In the extreme, non-
compliance could be deterred entirely, leaving no opportunities for the state to impose penalties. 
Paradoxically, perfect monitoring and enforcement could result in zero observed detections 
and penalties.  Conversely, many observed detections and penalties could be symptomatic 
of erratic or arbitrary enforcement that encourages non-compliance.  In the countries in our 
study, effective monitoring and enforcement can generally be expected to result in at least some 
observable detection and penalties, but this need not always be true.
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Figure 6 shows the scores for monitoring and enforcement.  It is immediately obvious that 
monitoring and enforcement scores are much lower than those for regulation, averaging only 
0.28.  Compared with the eight of 10 countries that scored above the midpoint (0.50) on 
regulations, only Zimbabwe meets that standard for monitoring and enforcement, although we 
set the bar low: a state needs to detect or punish non-compliance with a rule only once in five 
years to get the highest score.  Low monitoring and enforcement scores signal that a state is more 
successful at imposing rules and restrictions on mining companies than meeting its obligations 
to implement them.  Lesotho and Botswana have the lowest scores.  A possible explanation is 
that diamond companies run as public-private partnerships dominate both countries’ mining 
industries.  Some state oversight may be exercised within the companies involved.    The DRC 
has a low score, and though it has a large, state-owned mining company (Gécamines), its mining 
industry is less concentrated than those of Lesotho and Botswana.
Figure 6: Monitoring/Enforcement (scores with confidence intervals)
 
 
Active implementation of mining regulations turns out to have little to do with the prevalence 
of a state’s regulations.  Figure 7 shows the association between regulation, on one hand, and 
monitoring and enforcement, on the other.  The line slopes slightly downward, as the corresponding 
correlation is negative (-0.08).  The slope and the correlation are not far from zero.  It is evident that 
there is little or no correlation between the number of regulations a state has and the monitoring 
and enforcement of compliance. The right side of the graph, which depicts the countries with the 
most complete regulatory frameworks, illustrates this point.  Some countries, like Zimbabwe and 
South Africa, have the highest monitoring and enforcement scores.  Others, like Lesotho and 
Botswana, have the lowest scores.  The four countries with the least rules – Namibia, Swaziland, 
Malawi, and Madagascar –are comparatively effective in monitoring and enforcing compliance, 
with detection and punishment rates between a quarter and a third.
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Figure 7: Association between Regulation and Monitoring/Enforcement
Returning to our hypotheses about the relationship between mineral governance in potential 
and mineral governance in action, now with respect to the implementation of rules, the patterns 
in Figure 8 indicate that state capacity and accountability do contribute to better monitoring 
and enforcement.  The lines in both panels slope upward, showing positive correlations.  The 
pattern is sharper for accountability than it is for capacity.  Monitoring and enforcement is 
more sensitive to accountability mechanisms and an active civil society and citizenry than it 
is to state capacity.  The correlations in Figure 8 are almost twice as strong as the analogous 















































Figure 8: Association of Monitoring/Enforcement with Capacity and with Accountability
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correlations with regulation in Figure 
5.  Accountability seems to be especially 
important in pressurising the state to 
monitor and enforce its own regulations.
Regulatory Presence
Regulatory presence is a concept that 
combines the prevalence of regulation 
with overall detection and punishment of 
non-compliance. It is the average of the 
regulation score and a revised monitoring 
and enforcement score, with the detection 
and punishment of non-compliance 
by mining companies calculated as a 
proportion of all 38 rules.  It differs from 
the original monitoring and enforcement 
score, which was the proportion of only 
those rules a country actually has in place. 
The rationale for the difference is to avoid 
indirectly favouring countries with few 
regulations in an indicator of regulatory 
presence.
Figure 9 illustrates the construction of the 
indicator, with countries ordered according 
to their scores.  The bottom half of each 
box is for regulations, and the horizontal 
bar represents the proportion of a country’s 
regulations.  South Africa and Zambia, 
for example, have about 80 percent of the 
possible rules (as shown in Figure 4) and so 
the horizontal bar fills about 80 percent of 
the bottom half of the box.  The top half of 
each box is divided between detected non-
compliance and punished non-compliance. 
The bars are stacked because it is impossible 
to detect non-compliance without first 
regulating, and it is impossible to punish 
non-compliance without first detecting 
it.  The regulatory presence score is the 
proportion of the box filled by the bars. 
The more a country regulates, detects, and 
punishes, the higher its score.  However, 




































Figure 9: Regulatory Presence (scores from components)
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scores.  Lesotho’s score is almost identical to Malawi’s, for example, but Lesotho’s in the case of 
Lesotho this is almost entirely due to regulations, while Malawi regulates less but detects and 
punishes more.  
Regulatory presence gives a summary of mineral governance in action by combining the 
prevalence of regulations and the extent of state detection and punishment of non-compliance. 
Figure 10 shows the scores (with confidence intervals).  The scores can never exceed the regulation 
scores in Figure 4, because achieving the same score for regulatory presence as for regulation 
would require detecting and punishing non-compliance for every rule.  Figure 10 shows that 
that is far from the truth, with an average score of 0.40.  South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe 
are the only countries to achieve at least 50 percent.  Five other countries are clustered below 
half and above one third – Botswana, DRC, Madagascar, Lesotho, and Malawi.  Meanwhile, 
the bottom two include the countries with the smallest mining industry in dollar terms in 
the 10-country sample, Swaziland, and the country with the fifth largest industry, Namibia. 
Namibia’s low score is anomalous, reflecting its unusually sparse regulatory framework.
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The Relationship between Mineral Governance in Potential and Mineral 
Governance in Action 
Regulatory presence is the most encompassing indicator of mineral governance in action.  
In this section we examine its association with our indicators of mineral governance in potential. 
Figure 11 repeats the now familiar pattern: Regulatory presence is positively associated with 
both indicators, and it is more closely associated with accountability (correlation of 0.69) than 
with capacity (correlation of 0.32).  
Mineral governance in action in our 10 Southern African countries falls markedly short of the 
ideal. Many features of the regulatory framework outlined in documents such as the Africa 
Mining Vision are missing.  More importantly, implementation is weak.  However, scores on 
indicators of regulations, monitoring, and enforcement vary considerably among countries. 
Accountability in the mining sector appears to be more crucial than capacity in influencing a 
country’s record for developing regulations and implementing them.  Yet, since only 10 countries 
are included in the study, these patterns are suggestive but far from statistically definitive.
Figure 11: Association of Regulatory Presence with Capacity and with Accountability
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Unpacking Mineral Governance 
by Issue-Area
In this section the four issue-areas are described in more detail and the additional issue area, 
ASM, is analysed. 
The Issue-Areas
National Economic and Fiscal Linkages
If the extraction of non-renewable mineral resources is to contribute to sustainable economic 
development, rents from mineral extraction must be used to stimulate economic activity in 
other sectors.  Rents are the unearned benefits of mining; the profits earned above the costs 
of extraction and a normal return to capital.  The three main options for harnessing rents for 
broader development are:
•  Stimulating upstream (or backward) economic linkages by procuring inputs to 
mining, including labour, domestically;
•  Downstream (or forward) economic linkages by processing mineral output 
domestically, and 
•  Fiscal linkages by taxing rents and using them to promote economic development 
(Barma et. al 2012; Lewis 1989).
The indicator of linkages is based on 11 items listed in Box 3, clustered into six sub-indicators. 
These sub-indicators relate to data provision, taxes and profit retention, contribution to 
development funds and infrastructure, beneficiation and local procurement of inputs, job 
creation, and technical skills transfer.
Community Impact
Even if mineral extraction contributes to the national economy, local communities affected 
by mining may not benefit and they may be harmed.  The mining industry poses risks and 
challenges more acutely than other industries.  For example, mining typically makes heavy 
demands on local livelihood resources such as land and water and the physical location of 
mineral resources may lead to the displacement of communities.  While mining can create local 
economic opportunities, it also makes communities more vulnerable to mining accidents and 
disasters and in the longer term to mine closure.
The indicator of community impact is based on 13 items listed in Box 3, clustered into six 
sub-indicators.  These sub-indicators relate to consulting with and getting consent from local 
communities, conducting social impact assessments, using local land and water resources, 
displacing and resettling local communities and providing employment opportunities, providing 
infrastructure, and providing social protection in the face of accidents and mine closure.
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Labour
Mineral extraction raises labour issues that are common to all industrial employment, and 
others - particularly related to health and safety - that are more acute in the mining industry. 
The labour indicator is based on nine items listed in Box 3, clustered into four sub-indicators:
• Wages and large-scale retrenchment; 
• Health and safety in the workplace;
• Gender equity and children’s rights;
•  A mining company’s discretion to discipline individual workers or terminate their 
employment.
Environment
Mineral extraction by definition involves the depletion of non-renewable subsoil assets, and the 
process of mining carries other environmental costs.  The notion of “green accounting” is based 
on the premise that an assessment of mining and development must tally the benefits against 
the costs in terms of resource depletion and environmental damage (World Bank 2011).
The environment indicator is based on six items listed in Box 3, clustered into four sub-indicators:
• Legal liability for environmental damage caused;  
•  Whether or not a mining company is subject to limits on the quantity of resources 
they may extract;
•  A mining company’s responsibilities regarding environmental impact assessments and 
environmental assessment plans;
• Requirements in relation to environmental protection.
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Mineral Governance by Issue-Area
How does mineral governance differ across the four issue-areas?  Countries can vary markedly, 
but it is useful to analyse whether, on average, some issue-areas have substantially more regulation 
or regulatory presence than others.  
Figure 12 depicts the component breakdown of regulatory presence by issue-area, averaged 
over the 10 Southern African countries.  Labour (0.48) and environment (0.48) outperform 
community (0.35) and linkages (0.29).  The ranking on regulation alone is the same, although 
the scores are higher, given imperfect implementation.  The scores, upon which the “regulate” bars 
are based, are 0.80 for labour, 0.68 for environment, 0.57 for community, and 0.47 for linkages. 
Figure 12: Regulatory Presence by Issue-Area (scores from components) 
A possible interpretation is that labour and environment regulations apply by default throughout 
the economy, while regulations regarding community impact and national linkages are more 
specific to mineral extraction.  A complementary interpretation is that civil society may be 
better organised around labour and environmental issues, while the affected constituencies 
in the other-issue areas are more geographically isolated (community impact) or sectorally 
fragmented (national linkages).  Community impact and national linkages have become more 
important priorities in mineral governance, for example in the Africa Mining Vision, but the 
mining codes of the different countries have changed to reflect this.
Breaking down the regulatory framework of each country by issue-area gives a more textured 
perspective.  Figure 13 depicts regulation within each issue-area for each country.  Countries are 
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omitted because the number of items is much smaller within issue-areas.  In the upper panels, 
for labour and environment, most scores are in the top third of the scale (coloured green), while 
the rest are in the middle third (coloured amber).  In the lower panels, many more scores are in 
the amber zone, with some even in the bottom third, coloured red.  
More cross-national variation exists in community and linkages.  In linkages industrialised 
countries have higher scores, possibly reflecting the influence of established economic interests 
in mineral processing and procurement.  In community, Madagascar emerges as a surprise 
leader with 92 percent of the rules in place.  This reflects a particular concern about regulating 
the expansion of mining in populated areas.
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Figure 14 depicts the cross-national breakdown of regulatory presence by country.  An obvious 
difference from regulation is that no green scores are achieved in any of the four panels.  This 
is due to highly imperfect monitoring and enforcement.  The pattern of regulatory presence is 
otherwise similar to that for regulation alone.  The many red scores in community and linkages, 
particularly near the bottom of those panels, highlights the lack of effective regulation regarding 
local social impact and enclave tendencies in mining.
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Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining (ASM): 
An Additional Issue-Area
ASM is a special theme in the Africa Mining Vision.  Artisanal mining can refer to mining 
carried out using practices and tools that preceded and coexist with large-scale, capital-intensive 
mining.  The broader ASM category can refer to a wide range of activities, including surface 
mining using mechanised earth-moving equipment, typically with a permit.  Artisanal mining 
is a particular concern because it is directly relevant to local livelihoods, sometimes for the 
better and sometimes for the worse.  It can contribute, and has contributed, to the livelihoods 
of communities located near mineral deposits.  Yet because artisanal mining is often poorly 
regulated, unregulated, or illegal, its benefits come with social, economic, and environmental 
risks.  An appropriate and effective regulatory framework for the ASM sector is the goal.
Since ASM does not directly involve the large-scale mining companies that are active in other 
issue-areas, the focus of the study was on determining the extent to which rules are in place 
to govern ASM, as shown in Box 5.  We asked whether laws or official regulations distinguish 
between ASM and large-scale mining and, if so, if licenses or permits are required for ASM.  We 
investigated whether ASM is restricted to specific geographical areas or mineral commodities. 
We also investigated whether ASM is subject to health and safety regulations and whether child 
labour is banned.  Finally, we checked whether any laws or regulations encourage integrating 
ASM with larger-scale mining, called for in the Africa Mining Vision.  
 
Box 5:  Measuring Regulation of Artisanal and Small Scale Mining
The indicator of ASM Regulation consists of the following 8 individual 
indicators. 
Do laws or regulations:
•  Explicitly distinguish between artisanal and small scale mining and larger scale 
mining?
•  Specify geographic areas or zones where ASM is or is not permitted?
•  Specify which minerals can or cannot be extracted through ASM?
•  Ban the use of child labour in ASM? 
•  Set out specific requirements or regulations that affect the safety of those mining 
in the ASM sector?
•  Set out specific requirements or regulations that affect the health conditions of 
those mining in the ASM sector?
•  Require licenses or permits for those mining in the ASM sector?
•  Encourage greater integration of ASM with the formal and larger scale mining 
sector?
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Figure 15 depicts the results reflecting that the ASM regulations in the 10 countries range 
from comprehensive to non-existent.  Madagascar and the DRC possess all eight of the items 
that we looked for, giving them perfect scores.  They are also the two countries with by far the 
largest recorded ASM sectors in Southern Africa (see Yager 2016; 2014).  At the other end of 
the spectrum Malawi and South Africa lack policies on ASM.  South Africa essentially treats 
artisanal mining as illegal mining, and in recent years has experienced several disasters in which 
illegal miners have been trapped in disused mining shafts.
Figure 15: Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining (ASM)
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An Aggregate Indicator of Mineral 
Governance
A central aim of the study has been to develop a basis for comparing mineral governance in 
Southern African countries.  The indicators presented probe several dimensions – from state 
capacity and accountability to the prevalence of regulations across several issue-areas and the 
degree of observable monitoring and enforcement.  Countries that score well on some indicators 
occasionally score poorly on others, but for the most part key indicators correlate positively 
with each other.  An indicator that aggregates the major indicators of mineral governance 
can summarise overall patterns.  In this section we construct such an indicator and then use 
quantitative analysis and qualitative insights to explore what it can and cannot tell us about 
mineral governance in Southern Africa.
The aggregate indicator is informed by the distinction between mineral governance in potential 
and mineral governance in action.  These two major components are given equal weight in 
calculating the aggregate.  Mineral governance in potential includes state capacity and state 
accountability, while mineral governance in action includes regulation and monitoring/
enforcement.  The aggregate indicator is the simple average of four components: State capacity, 
state accountability, regulation, and monitoring/enforcement.  
Table 2 depicts correlations between the aggregate and its components.  Every correlation is 
positive.  The positive correlations emerge because scores on the component indicators generally 
go together, with some countries getting higher scores across the board, and others getting 
lower scores across the board.  The positive correlations are inflated because each component is 
mathematically contained in the aggregate.  The component most closely correlated with the 
aggregate is accountability (0.85).  This means that the distribution of a country’s aggregate 
scores closely mirrors the distribution of its accountability scores.  This in turn means that 
accountability captures features of mineral governance that are closely associated with the other 
components.  The component most weakly correlated with the aggregate is regulation (0.50), 
which means that the prevalence of regulations is not aligned to overall mineral governance to 
the extent that the other three components are.
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The aggregate score and its confidence interval are depicted for each country in Figure 16.  The 
10-country average of 0.52 highlights the fact that there is ample room for improving mineral 
governance in Southern Africa since approximately half of the attributes and actions we looked 
for were in place at the end of 2015.  The four countries with scores that exceed the average are 
all major mining economies: South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Zambia.  The countries 
with the two lowest scores have small mining industries: Lesotho and Swaziland.  They do not 
lag far behind a number of countries with similar scores and overlapping confidence intervals: 
Malawi, Madagascar, the DRC, and Namibia.
Figure 16: Aggregate Mineral Governance (scores with confidence intervals)
A single numerical score only partially represents the challenges of mineral governance that a 
country faces.  Box 6 contains comments from the in-country researchers, with countries listed 
from the highest to the lowest aggregate scores.  
Some common themes emerge from these qualitative impressions of mineral governance. 
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Box 6: Insights from In-Country Researchers 
(countries ordered by Aggregate score)
South Africa (Wole Olaleye)
“Seemingly confrontational relations between the state and mining companies 
in South Africa reflect the government’s efforts to show the public that it takes 
the transformation of the mining industry seriously.  Yet many citizens see this 
transformation as expanding the stake of black elites at the expense of vulnerable 
mining communities.”
Zimbabwe (Patience Mutopo)
“Zimbabwe scores highly on mineral governance, but the broader political and 
economic context could undermine these successes. Also, many citizens believe 
that the Mines and Minerals Act gives too much power to foreign-based mining 
companies, as it is colonial-era legislation. The mining sector faces major challenges 
despite past gains.”
Botswana (Nancy Kgengwenyane)
“The fact that Botswana’s has few examples of officially detected non-compliance 
and penalties imposed regarding mining regulations may be because diamonds form 
the backbone of the country’s economy, and therefore mining companies operate 
and act at high levels of due diligence and compliance.”
Zambia (Edward Lange)
“Since the privatization reforms in Zambia, many government officials do business 
with mining companies, and government decisions about the sector are often driven 
by the mining houses.  The state’s technical capacity is also weak – for example it 
does not have clear estimates of mineral reserves – and this weakness is exploited by 
mining companies in negotiations with government.”
Malawi (Rachel Etter-Phoya)
“Malawi has few comprehensive rules about community impact and benefits or 
economic linkages. But mining governance is improving. The anticipated new Mines 
and Minerals Bill will hopefully usher in a new approach as the sector grows – 
ensuring that communities have a greater say about their future, and that mining is 
better integrated into the development of the national economy.”
Madagascar (Tim Healy)
“Although there are few large-scale mining operations in Madagascar, artisanal 
and small-scale mining (ASM) activities are vast and scattered throughout country – 
estimated to involve up to one million individuals.  Since the 1990s the country has 
adopted mining and environmental instruments that address ASM and communities 
near mines, but there has been very little effective implementation.”
Congo, DR (Arthur Kaniki)
“The DRC has progressive mining legislation in place. The high level of non-
compliance by mining companies reflects the state’s lack of capacity to monitor and 
enforce its own policies, as well as the prevalence of corruption among officials 
responsible for detecting and sanctioning non-compliance.” 
Namibia (Maximillian Weylandt)
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“Namibia’s lack of mining regulations can be traced to the fact that major 
legislation is up to two decades old.  The country has not kept up with international 
expectations, especially on transparency in the extractive sector.  A new Minerals Act 
has been in the works for years, but it is unclear when it will be tabled. The planned 
introduction of an Access to Information law next year could improve transparency in 
the sector.”
Swaziland (Sabelo Gumedze)
“Swaziland has no great mineral wealth, and what it has is not equitably distributed. 
Owing to a weak political and economic system, mineral governance remains weak. 
Prospects for mining expansion exist, but mining deals are shrouded in secrecy – not 
ideal for mineral governance.”
Lesotho (Lehlohonolo Chefa)
“There are two major challenges of mining governance in Lesotho – corruption 
and weak institutions.  The two are linked because when institutions are weak, 
ineffective, and under-resourced it makes it easy for rent-seekers to exchange bribes 
for mining rights.” 
Comments on South Africa and Zimbabwe, the two top-ranked countries, highlight tensions 
between the state and mining companies. This contrasts with the comment on Botswana, the 
country in third place.  A history of settler and colonial rule in South Africa and Zimbabwe has 
fed public perceptions that mining benefits a white and/or foreign elite, rather than contributing 
to more inclusive patterns of economic development.  The large mining industries and well-
established institutions in these countries goes a long way in explaining their high scores.  However, 
tensions between the state and mining companies may motivate more aggressive monitoring 
and enforcement of existing regulations and this could paradoxically raise numerical scores.  The 
comment on Botswana paints a picture of greater cooperation with high levels of compliance 
by mining companies.  Greater compliance means fewer opportunities to detect and punish 
violations of mining regulations, which would paradoxically lower Botswana’s numerical score.
Comments on Zambia, the DRC, and Namibia – countries with substantial mining industries 
that score less well – highlight different shortcomings that can undermine mineral governance. 
The contrast is sharpest between the DRC and Namibia.  The comment on DRC indicates that 
the country has progressive mining regulations but weak monitoring and enforcement.  The 
comment on Namibia indicates that the country has limited mining regulations and that these 
have barely been modified for decades.  However, the component scores showed that Namibia 
does monitor and enforce the regulations it does have.  The DRC and Namibia have similar 
aggregate scores but their strengths and weaknesses are not identical.  Zambia illustrates yet 
another pattern: it is near the top on regulatory presence but near the bottom on state capacity, 
apparently due to the partial capture of the state by mining companies following privatisation 
reforms.
Comments on Madagascar and Malawi – countries with small, emerging mining industries – 
highlight differences in community impact and ASM.  Madagascar’s score is high with respect 
to these two areas, while Malawi’s score is low.  The comment on Madagascar emphasises the 
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unusual prominence of ASM and a related concern with the potential impact of large-scale 
mining on local communities.  The comment on Malawi implies that the lack of attention 
to community impact is partly due to the smallness of the sector.  Differences in regulation 
between the countries may exaggerate differences in mineral governance as the countries have 
similar aggregate scores. The comment on Madagascar points to implementation problems, 
while the comment on Malawi anticipates improvements in regulations.
Comments on Swaziland and Lesotho, countries with small mining industries and the lowest 
aggregate scores, highlight problems related to lack of transparency and corruption (also mentioned 
in the comment on the DRC).  These are reminders that even in countries with limited state capacity, 
challenges of mineral governance are not simply to do with technical expertise and administrative 
effectiveness.  Without institutions to hold state officials and mining companies accountable, 
mineral governance can be undermined by rent-seeking in the public and private sectors.  
This section has summarised the indicators of mineral governance in a single aggregate.  The 
statistical correlations between the aggregate and its components clarified important patterns 
in the data, while the comments from in-country researchers added qualitative insight.  In the 
concluding section, we draw together lessons about mineral governance and about measuring 
mineral governance in Southern Africa.
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Conclusion
The Mineral Governance Barometer is a pilot study that has developed empirical indicators of 
mineral governance in 10 Southern African countries.  Despite increasing attention being given 
to the importance of mineral governance in the region, many studies have focused on the details 
of particular countries or issues, while the coverage of Southern Africa in larger cross-national 
data sets has been patchy.  The lack of systematically compiled indicators has hindered the 
comparative assessment of mineral governance across countries and issue-areas.
The study has conceptualised mineral governance as governance in potential, in particular the 
presence of a capable and accountable state, and governance in action, the patterns of regulation, 
monitoring, and enforcement undertaken by the state.  While our approach is informed by 
the issue-areas highlighted in documents such as the Africa Mining Vision, we see mineral 
governance as more than adopting a regulatory blueprint.  
Regulations in the mining sector typically impose requirements and restrictions on mining 
companies. Consensus has emerged within the region and beyond that such regulations are 
necessary if mining is to contribute to inclusive and sustainable development.  
We have further emphasised that when a state imposes requirements and restrictions on mining 
companies, it simultaneously imposes direct obligations on itself and indirect obligations on 
citizens and civil society.  The direct obligations are to monitor the compliance of mining 
companies and to impose penalties when non-compliance is identified.  The indirect obligations 
on citizens and civil society are to hold the state and mining companies accountable in fulfilling 
their obligations under law.  The conception of mineral governance as a set of linked obligations 
upon mining companies, the state, and ultimately citizens and civil society is a running theme 
in the study.
An important empirical finding is that state accountability is a central component of mineral 
governance, closely correlated with state capacity and with monitoring and enforcement.  We 
measured state accountability by investigating the laws and participatory institutional mechanisms 
that citizens and civil society can use to hold the state and mining companies to account.  The 
centrality of accountability shows that state officials most diligently keep track the activities of 
mining companies when they know that that citizens and civil society are keeping track of them. 
Although adopting appropriate policies and building administrative capacity are important, the 
study suggests that laws and institutions that give voice to the ostensible beneficiaries of mineral 
extraction are perhaps the most fundamental bases for the effective The study also helped to 
identify gaps in regulatory presence – a composite of regulations, monitoring, and enforcement. 
Overall we found that many of the kinds of regulations advocated in documents like the 
Africa Mining Vision are in place, but there is an absence of observable evidence of effective 
monitoring and enforcement.  Our in-country researchers provided anecdotal reminders that 
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failures in monitoring and enforcement do not necessarily reflect a general lack of capacity 
but can sometimes be explained by corruption and other accountability failures.  Regulatory 
presence also varied by issue-area, being somewhat greater for labour and environment than 
for national economic and fiscal linkages and community impact.  One possible explanation is 
that citizens and civil society are often better organised around labour and environmental issues, 
while affected constituencies in the other issues-area are more likely to be sectorally fragmented 
(economic and fiscal linkages) or geographically isolated (community impact).
As a pilot study, the barometer provides a useful baseline for more systemic analysis of mineral 
governance in Southern Africa.  An obvious direction for further research would be to extend 
the barometer to other countries, and perhaps to extend sectoral coverage to petroleum. 
Another complementary direction would be to probe patterns of contestation across a range 
of key stakeholders – from the state and mining companies to labour unions and civil society 
organisations.  The current study has focused on collecting evidence to describe patterns of 
regulatory presence.  In doing so it uncovered the substantive importance of accountability 
mechanisms and methodological challenges of observational equivalence.  For example, the 
absence of penalties imposed on mining companies could be a sign of poor state enforcement 
or high company compliance, and widespread penalties imposed on mining companies could 
be a sign of strong state enforcement or of confrontational state-company relations.  A clearer 
picture of subjective stakeholder views would help to clarify the kind of objective descriptive 
evidence contained in this study.
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Appendix:  
Statistical Summaries
Table 3: Univariate Descriptive Statistics
mean median minimum maximum
State Capacity 0.54 0.49 0.28 0.93
State Accountability 0.63 0.61 0.45 0.92
Regulation 0.63 0.67 0.35 0.82
 Linkages 0.47 0.58 0.08 0.75
 Community Impact 0.57 0.65 0.13 0.92
 Labour 0.80 0.79 0.50 1.00
 Environment 0.68 0.75 0.50 0.75
Monitoring/Enforcement 0.28 0.30 0.02 0.54
Regulatory Presence 0.40 0.40 0.23 0.56
 Linkages 0.29 0.31 0.04 0.58
 Community Impact 0.35 0.40 0.08 0.65
 Labour 0.48 0.46 0.28 0.65
 Environment 0.48 0.52 0.28 0.59
ASM 0.64 0.75 0.00 1.00
Aggregate 0.52 0.48 0.36 0.77
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Table 4: Selected Bivariate Correlations





Capacity 1.00 0.36 0.19 0.32 0.32 0.74
Accountability 0.36 1.00 0.34 0.79 0.69 0.85
Regulation 0.19 0.34 1.00 -0.08 0.88 0.50
Monitoring/Enforcement 0.32 0.79 -0.08 1.00 0.40 0.69
Regulatory Presence 0.32 0.69 0.88 0.40 1.00 0.79
Aggregate 0.74 0.85 0.50 0.69 0.79 1.00
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Botswana 0.908 0.049 0.509 0.101 0.760 0.084 0.105 0.039 0.420 0.047 0.571 0.050
Congo, DR 0.300 0.101 0.625 0.099 0.698 0.082 0.164 0.065 0.406 0.050 0.447 0.052
Lesotho 0.283 0.096 0.448 0.106 0.705 0.084 0.022 0.022 0.360 0.045 0.365 0.044
Madagascar 0.521 0.096 0.451 0.100 0.604 0.088 0.276 0.068 0.385 0.048 0.463 0.052
Malawi 0.463 0.094 0.651 0.093 0.514 0.090 0.334 0.091 0.343 0.050 0.490 0.059
Namibia 0.564 0.094 0.498 0.095 0.347 0.085 0.315 0.095 0.228 0.040 0.431 0.062
Swaziland 0.447 0.101 0.590 0.096 0.396 0.088 0.237 0.084 0.245 0.041 0.417 0.060
South Africa 0.925 0.046 0.917 0.047 0.781 0.077 0.440 0.071 0.562 0.052 0.766 0.047
Zambia 0.364 0.096 0.703 0.091 0.823 0.069 0.335 0.067 0.549 0.052 0.556 0.051
Zimbabwe 0.612 0.090 0.862 0.051 0.646 0.085 0.540 0.080 0.497 0.053 0.665 0.049
Note: Standard errors for the (weighted) estimates are calculated using the Cochran method as described by Gatz 
and Smith (1995: 1186).  Confidence intervals in the figures in report are centred on the estimate, plus or minus 
1.16 standard errors – meaning that the null hypothesis of no difference can be rejected for two horizontally 
non-overlapping intervals with roughly 90 per cent confidence.  Issue-area indicators and Licenses/Contracts are 
not reported because they are based on too few component scores to calculate meaningful standard errors, and 
the estimates themselves are included in figures in the main report.

OSISA is a growing African institution committed to deepening democracy, protecting 
human rights and enhancing good governance in the region. Its vision is to promote 
and sustain the ideals, values, institutions and practices of open society, with the aim of 
establishing vibrant and tolerant southern African democracies in which people, free from 
material and other deprivation, understand their rights and responsibilities and participate 
actively in all spheres of life.
In pursuance of this vision, OSISA’s mission is to initiate and support programmes 
working towards open society ideals and to advocate for these ideals in southern Africa. 
Established in 1997, OSISA works in 11 southern African countries: Angola, Botswana, 
DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Madagascar, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. OSISA works differently in each of these countries, according to local 
conditions.
OSISA is part of a network of autonomous Open Society Foundations, established by 
George Soros, located in Eastern and Central Europe, the former Soviet Union, Africa, 
Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and the US.
SARW is a formative project within the Natural Resources Governance Initiative of 
OSISA. Its main objective is to monitor corporate and state conduct in the extraction 
and beneficiation of natural resources in Southern Africa. It seeks to assess the extent to 
which the policies, practices and efforts of the players in the sector can and do contribute 
to sustainable development. Other specific objectives include:
•  To consolidate research and advocacy on natural resources extraction issues in 
Southern Africa; 
•  To put a spotlight on the specific dynamics of natural resources in Southern Africa, 
building a distinctive understanding of the regional geo-political dynamics of 
resource economics; 
•  To provide for researchers, policy makers and social justice activists especially in 
academic and civic spaces- a platform of action, coordination and organisation, 
in the watching and strengthening of corporate and state accountability in natural 
resources extraction; 
•  To highlight the relationship between resource extraction activities and human rights 
as they obtain on the ground, and develop advocacy efforts that engage this reality.

